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ACCESS TO ALGORITHMS 
Hannah Bloch-Wehba* 
 
Federal, state, and local governments increasingly depend on automated 
systems—often procured from the private sector—to make key decisions 
about civil rights and liberties.  When individuals affected by these decisions 
seek access to information about the algorithmic methodologies that 
produced them, governments frequently assert that this information is 
proprietary and cannot be disclosed. 
Recognizing that opaque algorithmic governance poses a threat to civil 
rights and liberties, scholars have called for a renewed focus on 
transparency and accountability for automated decision-making.  But 
scholars have neglected a critical avenue for promoting public 
accountability and transparency for automated decision-making:  the law of 
access to government records and proceedings.  This Article fills this gap in 
the literature, recognizing that the Freedom of Information Act, its state 
equivalents, and the First Amendment provide unappreciated legal support 
for algorithmic transparency. 
The law of access performs three critical functions in promoting 
algorithmic accountability and transparency.  First, by enabling any 
individual to challenge algorithmic opacity in government records and 
proceedings, the law of access can relieve some of the burden otherwise 
borne by parties who are often poor and underresourced.  Second, access 
law calls into question government’s procurement of algorithmic decision-
making technologies from private vendors, subject to contracts that include 
sweeping protections for trade secrets and intellectual property rights.  
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Berman, David Cohen, Ellen Goodman, Ben Green, Ben Grunwald, Christina Koningisor, 
Irina Manta, Christopher Reed, Rory Van Loo, and Andrew Selbst for helpful conversations 
and feedback.  I am indebted to Lauren Kirchner and Julia Angwin, now of The Markup, and 
to Dick Tofel of ProPublica for bringing this issue to my attention.  I am also grateful for the 
opportunity to present earlier versions of this project at the Seton Hall Law Artificial 
Intelligence and the Law Conference, UC Irvine’s Technology, Law & Society Summer 
Institute, Hofstra Law’s Intellectual Property Colloquium, Yale Law School’s Information 
Society Project, the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, and the Mid-Atlantic Junior 
Faculty Forum.  Finally, I am indebted to the student editors of the Fordham Law Review for 
their meticulous and thoughtful editing.  This Article reflects the current state of developments 
in February 2020, when it was finalized for publication.  All errors are my own. 
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Finally, the law of access can promote an urgently needed public debate on 
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INTRODUCTION 
Government decision-making is increasingly automated.  Cities use 
machine-learning algorithms to track gunshots,1 determine where to send 
police on patrol,2 and fire ineffective teachers.3  State agencies use algorithms 
 
 1. See Chris Weller, There’s a Secret Technology in 90 US Cities That Listens for 
Gunfire 24/7, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2017, 10:59 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
how-shotspotter-works-microphones-detecting-gunshots-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/F6KX-
R25U]. 
 2. See Stephen Goldsmith & Chris Bousquet, The Right Way to Regulate Algorithms, 
CITYLAB (Mar. 20, 2018), citylab.com/equity/2018/03/the-right-way-to-regulate-algorithms/ 
555998 [https://perma.cc/WWP4-B8YC]. 
 3. See generally Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017) [hereinafter HISD]. 
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to predict criminal behavior,4 interpret DNA evidence,5 and allocate 
Medicaid benefits.6  Courts decide, using “decision-support” tools, whether 
a suspect poses a risk,7 eligibility for pretrial release,8 and how harsh a 
sentence to impose.9  The federal government uses algorithms to put 
individuals on immigrant and terrorist watchlists,10 make policy decisions 
about whether and how to change Social Security,11 and catch tax evaders.12 
How are these new technologies changing government decision-making?  
“Algorithmic governance”13—a term this Article uses to refer to the use of 
automated decision-making methodologies by governments to inform the 
policymaking and adjudicative process—might make decision-making 
faster, more objective, and more reliable:  in other words, more “efficient.”14  
But increasing automation may also make government less participatory and 
open to public oversight and input.15 
This Article examines the potential role of the law of access to government 
proceedings and records in promoting algorithmic transparency and 
accountability in public sector decision-making. 
Courts across the country have already had occasion to consider challenges 
to automated determinations arising in sectors such as health care, education, 
welfare, and criminal justice and have repeatedly concluded that due process 
requires the use of ascertainable public standards that enable those affected 
to challenge their determinations.16  In case after case, litigants have 
 
 4. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 503 (2018). 
 5. See generally Second Letter, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-565 (S.D.N.Y. May 
9, 2016), ECF No. 41.  The author represented ProPublica in this litigation. 
 6. See generally K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015); Michael 
T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016), 
modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.W. 
Va. Mar. 26, 2018); Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, 
VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/ 
healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/7RQY-G8YT]. 
 7. See Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform 
Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 222 (2015). 
 8. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK & 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS:  A PRIMER FOR COURTS (2014), https://www.ncsc.org/~/ 
media/Microsites/Files/CSI/BJA%20RNA%20Final%20Report_Combined%20Files%208-
22-14.ashx [https://perma.cc/7995-V78V]. 
 9. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016). 
 10. See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of 
Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1136 (2013). 
 11. See Nicholas Diakopoulos, Accountability in Algorithmic Decision Making, COMM. 
ACM, Feb. 2016, at 56, 58–59. 
 12. See generally Paul Merrion, Nonprofit Think Tank Plays Key Role in IRS Decision-
Making, MLEX U.S. TAX WATCH, Oct. 2018, at 5. 
 13. See generally Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for 
the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103 (2018). 
 14. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot:  Administrative Decision 
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1156 (2017). 
 15. See generally John Danaher, The Threat of Algocracy:  Reality, Resistance and 
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & TECH. 245 (2016). 
 16. See infra Part I. 
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sought—and successfully obtained—disclosure of key information about 
automated decision-making methodologies in the public sector.17 
These challenges are best interpreted as efforts to vindicate an important 
set of transparency interests:  the right to know why and how the government 
reached a particular decision that affects someone.18  As such, these cases 
resonate within the broader framework of transparency law, which aims to 
open government decision-making to public view.  Yet efforts to promote 
algorithmic transparency have largely overlooked the body of law that 
governs access to government proceedings and records:  the Freedom of 
Information Act19 (FOIA), its state equivalents, and the First Amendment.20 
By codifying expectations regarding the government’s disclosure of 
information to the public, the law of transparency and access operates both 
to protect the balance of power between the public and the government and 
to ensure that key information regarding government decision-making is 
open to public scrutiny.21  While these concerns overlap somewhat with 
individual interests in understanding how the government has reached 
decisions that affect people, they are also distinct in their operation and 
effect.  Because transparency law protects public rights of access to 
government, its remedies—chiefly, the disclosure of government records—
can be sought by those who are unaffected by the particular decisions or 
policies they wish to expose.22 
 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:  The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 
61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981); Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297 (1982); Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process:  
Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 
60, 62–63 (1976); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and 
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 485 (1986); Richard B. Saphire, 
Specifying Due Process Values:  Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural 
Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113 (1978). 
 19. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). 
 20. But see Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 133; Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 
14, at 22; Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration:  The Failure of 
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1376 (1991) (“The 
creation of transparent systems of data processing updates a traditional American belief in 
open government.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1364 (2016) (describing 
how FOIA was intended to benefit newsgathering, “facilitating democratic participation and 
exposing potential government corruption or malfeasance”) [hereinafter Kwoka, FOIA, Inc.]; 
see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980) (noting that 
the First Amendment has a “structural role” in protecting republican governance, based on 
“the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—
must be informed”); Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 202–03 
(2013) [hereinafter Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy] (describing how FOIA’s imposition of de 
novo review protects the “democratic process of holding the agency accountable to the public” 
in the face of agency self-interest). 
 22. These features are somewhat controversial, in part, because they have permitted 
commercial requesters to reap substantial profits from gathering and reselling government 
records and, in part, because the onerous burdens on the administrative state tend to threaten 
the “capacity and legitimacy of [government] institutions.” See David E. Pozen, 
Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 156, 159 (2018) (describing this feature 
of U.S. transparency law as the “transparency entitlement” and noting some of its deleterious 
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The public-facing structure of transparency law can make several 
important contributions to algorithmic transparency and accountability.  
First, it can shift the burden of challenging algorithmic opacity from those 
who are affected—often poor, underresourced litigants—to the press and the 
public, opening up new avenues to address opacity.23  Second, transparency 
law calls into question the legality of procurement practices that shield third-
party vendors from public scrutiny entirely.24  Third, transparency law can 
create more enduring prospective obligations for government to disclose its 
policies and procedures on a proactive basis.25 
Understanding how transparency law maps onto algorithmic governance 
sets the stage for future work that addresses the next generation of 
automation.  As the government procures and relies upon newer, more 
sophisticated decision-making technologies, such as machine learning, it also 
makes decisions more opaque, harder to explain, and less attributable to 
specific causes.26  The greater the decisional power of the technology, the 
higher the risk that arbitrary or opaque decisions might evade explanation.  
And this apparent arbitrariness, in turn, has engendered potent critiques of 
the credibility,27 fairness,28 and due process29 implications of decision-
making by algorithms significant for our understanding of how automation 
might jeopardize individuals’ civil rights and liberties. 
These features—some might call them bugs30—have prompted calls for 
new mechanisms of transparency and accountability in the age of 
algorithms.31  The trouble is that few can agree on how, exactly, society can 
advance these values.  Scholars have touted a range of mechanisms as 
 
effects); see also Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 21, at 1415–16 (pointing out that most of the 
commercial uses of FOIA are “not within FOIA’s bailiwick”). 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. See infra Part IV.A. 
 25. See infra Part IV.C. 
 26. See Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’:  Understanding Opacity in Machine 
Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 1 (“[R]arely does one have any 
concrete sense of how or why a particular classification has been arrived at from inputs.”); 
Vijay Pande, Artificial Intelligence’s ‘Black Box’ Is Nothing to Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/opinion/artificial-intelligence-black-box.html 
[https://perma.cc/MRL5-Q94A]. 
 27. See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2035 (2017). 
 28. See Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. 
REV. 671, 723 (2016). 
 29. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753–54 (Wis. 2016) (denying the defendant 
access to a proprietary algorithm used at sentencing); see also ALEX CAMPOLO ET AL., AI NOW 
INST., AI NOW 2017 REPORT (2017), https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2017_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZSC5-F747]; Danielle K. Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society:  
Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2014); Rebecca Wexler, 
Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets:  Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1369 (2018). 
 30. See Pande, supra note 26 (“[T]he so-called black box of artificial intelligence is more 
of a feature, not a bug.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning, FAT/ML, 
www.fatml.org [https://perma.cc/F4KB-HF2M] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (“[T]here is 
increasing alarm that the complexity of machine learning may reduce the justification for 
consequential decisions to ‘the algorithm made me do it.’”). 
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promoting algorithmic transparency and accountability.32  The extensive, and 
growing, menu of options includes reverse engineering,33 algorithmic impact 
statements,34 “value-centered design,”35 and audits.36  Others have 
concluded that machine learning poses no real threat to transparency at all.37 
These contributions have in common a key assumption:  simply disclosing 
the internal workings of many algorithmic decision-making tools—often 
encoded in source code or models—is insufficient to vindicate accountability 
and transparency interests.  First, disclosure is not only ineffective, it is also 
legally precluded because these materials are the proper subject of trade 
secret protections.38  Second, simply disclosing information about how an 
algorithm reaches a decision is insufficient to make that information 
meaningful to the subjects.39  As a result, these scholars argue, entirely new 
mechanisms for promoting algorithmic accountability and transparency are 
required.40 
But the rush to assess how best to promote accountability and transparency 
in artificial intelligence and machine learning threatens to overlook critical 
aspects of algorithmic governance in current use.  Even though machine 
learning has not yet been widely deployed in government decision-making, 
the turn toward algorithmic governance nonetheless already poses serious 
 
 32. See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 
109, 168 (2017) (calling for algorithmic impact statements). 
 33. NICHOLAS DIAKOPOULOS, TOW CTR. FOR DIG. JOUNRALISM, ALGORITHMIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORTING:  ON THE INVESTIGATION OF BLACK BOXES (2013), 
http://www.nickdiakopoulos.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Algorithmic-Accountability-
Reporting_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6UY-75LS]. 
 34. See, e.g., Selbst, supra note 32, at 168. 
 35. Cory Knobel & Geoffrey C. Bowker, Values in Design, COMM. ACM, July 2011, at 
26, 28. 
 36. See Julius, FairML:  Auditing Black-Box Predictive Models, CLOUDERA FAST 
FORWARD LABS (Mar. 9, 2017), https://blog.fastforwardlabs.com/2017/03/09/fairml-auditing-
black-box-predictive-models.html [https://perma.cc/XKQ4-ABXE]; see also Nicholas 
Diakopoulos et al., Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for 
Algorithms, FAT/ML, www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms 
[https://perma.cc/935U-Z354] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 37. See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic 
Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (contending that algorithmic governance generally 
can, although is not guaranteed to, comply with the transparency demands articulated within 
administrative law). 
 38. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 29, at 1346; see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, 
Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2017) 
(discussing trade secret protections for decision-making processes used by the private sector); 
Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 
54, 119 (2019) (same); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of 
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1092 (2018). 
 39. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 38, at 10 (“In addition, handing over code often will 
not enable the political accountability results those in favor of so-called algorithmic 
transparency desire.”); Selbst & Barocas, supra note 38, at 1107; Sandra Wachter et al., 
Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box:  Automated Decisions and the 
GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 841, 862–70 (2018); see also Burrell, supra note 26, at 9. 
 40. See generally Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 
(2017) (arguing that technological tools can promote algorithmic accountability as well as, 
and in some cases better than, legal and policy interventions). 
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obstacles to government transparency and accountability.  Those obstacles 
are attributable, not to the sophistication of decision-making methodologies 
but to a more basic shift toward privatization and automation in 
government.41  Artificial intelligence and machine learning raise serious, and 
specific, challenges to transparency and accountability, but this Article 
leaves for another day the project of considering how transparency law 
should respond. 
This Article contributes to ongoing debates about algorithmic 
accountability and transparency in three ways.42  First, by cataloging a range 
of proprietary algorithmic decision-support and decision-making tools relied 
upon in different civil, criminal, and administrative contexts, it highlights 
how extensively privatization and outsourcing have affected civil rights and 
liberties.  This impact extends beyond criminal law enforcement to other 
cutting-edge cases arising in civil contexts that have received scant scholarly 
attention.  Taken as a group, these cases illustrate an important pattern in 
challenges to algorithmic decision-making:  litigants are equally motivated 
to seek transparency of the government decision-making process as they are 
to challenge the substance of algorithmic decisions. 
Second, this Article rehabilitates disclosure as a remedy for algorithmic 
opacity in the public sector.  Algorithmic governance in the public sector 
heightens the interest in disclosure of key information regarding how 
automated decision-making functions.  Disclosure is the core mechanism of 
U.S. transparency law, which enshrines values of public access to 
government decision-making.43  But disclosure has been given short shrift as 
a mechanism for algorithmic accountability and transparency.44 
 
 41. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1323 (2017) 
(noting that transparency and disclosure obligations proposed for private enterprise “may be 
appropriate for governmental commercial algorithms”). 
 42. This Article contributes to a growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship that 
explores the accountability gap for new technologies of decision-making. See, e.g., 
DIAKOPOULOS, supra note 33; Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing:  
Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 
NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973 (2018); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28; Burrell, supra note 26; 
Danielle K. Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008); Citron & 
Pasquale, supra note 29; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process:  Toward 
a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); Danaher, 
supra note 15; Paul B. de Laat, Big Data and Algorithmic Decision-Making:  Can 
Transparency Restore Accountability?, ACM SIGCAS COMPUTERS & SOC’Y, Sept. 2017, at 
39; Katyal, supra note 38. 
 43. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 845 F.2d 1060, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(“[T]he settled policy of the FOIA is one of ‘full agency disclosure . . . .’” (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 89-813 (1965))), aff’d, 492 U.S. 136 (1989); see also David E. Pozen, Freedom of 
Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1102–03 
(2017) (“The engine of the FOIA system is the request for a government record.”). 
 44. This Article relates to a growing body of work that studies how the relationship 
between government and technology companies affects accountability and transparency. See, 
e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13; Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by 
Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595 (2016); David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets, 
18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61 (2011); see also Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing 
Secret Searches:  A First Amendment Right of Access to Electronic Surveillance Orders, 93 
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The primary obstacle to transparency is the pervasive practice of invoking 
trade secrecy to shield the methodologies of automated decision-making 
from scrutiny.45  Without resources to develop automated decision-making 
tools in-house, governments have often turned to decision-support systems 
purchased from the private sector.  These systems frequently come with 
license agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other documentation 
evincing claims that the contents are trade secrets.46 
Viewed from the perspective of transparency law, the invocation of 
commercial confidentiality and trade secrecy to shield government decision-
making from public view is legally suspect.47  These provisions cast doubt 
on the government’s ability to agree, through contract, to utilize decision-
making mechanisms that are inconsistent with these broad public-serving 
goals.  In practice, this sometimes puts government to a difficult choice:  
reveal a contractor’s trade secret or give up the use of an algorithmic tool 
altogether.48  Governments should implement transparency values 
throughout their contracting and procurement processes to ensure that 
proprietary decision-support tools are consistent with these aims. 
Finally, this Article reframes the debate about algorithmic transparency 
from affected individuals to the affected public.49  Existing scholarship has 
often considered whether trade secrecy interests should yield to the interests 
of individuals who are affected by algorithmic decision-making—namely, 
individuals with a sufficient liberty or property interest at stake.50  In the 
criminal justice context, scholars and advocates have embraced the use of 
protective orders to ensure that defendants have access to the algorithms that 
confer risk scores or analyze DNA or breathalyzer evidence—without 
jeopardizing trade secrets.51 
These compromises between the private vendors’ commercial interests 
and the liberty interests of those affected by algorithmic governance overlook 
the public’s separate and independent interest in oversight and monitoring of 
government decision-making.  In the criminal context, the constitutional 
 
WASH. L. REV. 145 (2018); Kristen Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 
467 (2017). 
 45. Katyal, supra note 38, at 60 (“In the context of artificial intelligence, we see a world 
where, at times, intellectual property principles prevent civil rights from adequately addressing 
the challenges of technology, thus stagnating a new generation of civil rights altogether.”); see 
also Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 37, at 33 (citing Loomis as support for the proposition that 
transparency principles do not compel disclosure of source code). 
 46. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 138–39. 
 47. See, e.g., DIAKOPOULOS, supra note 33. 
 48. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 49. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology 
Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 119 (2017); Natalie Ram, Innovating 
Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 686 (2018); David G. Robinson, The Challenges 
of Prediction:  Lessons from Criminal Justice, 14 I/S:  J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 151, 167 
(2018). 
 50. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 42, at 1254–55; Roth, supra note 27, at 2028; Wexler, 
supra note 29, at 1349. 
 51. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 29, at 1353 (“[C]ourts may issue protective orders to 
limit the use and distribution of trade secrets beyond the needs of the proceeding.”). 
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right of access to government proceedings and records casts doubt on 
whether prosecutors and courts can selectively disclose proprietary 
algorithms to affected individuals while shielding them from the public.52  
More broadly, selective disclosure tends to ignore the First Amendment’s 
“structural” role for the press and public in monitoring government 
proceedings.53 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I traces the emerging use of, and 
challenges to, proprietary, automated decision systems in health care, 
criminal justice, and education.  Part II unpacks how these challenges both 
assert the individual due process rights of litigants and also invoke the larger 
public interest in support of enhanced transparency.  Part III explores the 
procedural and substantive conflicts between proprietary decision-making on 
the one hand and government transparency obligations under the First 
Amendment and FOIA on the other.  Part IV briefly sketches some remedial 
measures that governments might take in order to alleviate concerns about 
the accountability and transparency of algorithmic governance. 
I.  THE RISE OF PUBLIC SECTOR ALGORITHMS 
It is hardly groundbreaking to observe that algorithms are increasingly 
prevalent in the public sector.  New technologies are supposed to make it 
easier for humans to make difficult decisions—and where is decision-making 
more difficult, or more important, than in government?  The kinds of 
decisions that the public sector must make are high stakes:  whether an 
individual who is arrested for murder, but claims he acted in self-defense, 
should be released from detention or stay in jail;54 whether a person who is 
profoundly disabled and requires home care in order to avoid being 
institutionalized should receive $70,000 or $140,000 in Medicaid waiver 
benefits;55 whether a public school teacher whose students perform worse 
than their peers on a statewide test should be laid off.56 
These scenarios are not simply hypotheticals.  They represent flash points 
between emerging methods of algorithmic decision-making and the rights of 
individuals to understand and challenge those decisions.  This Part surveys 
these conflicts, observing that increasing automation57 and privatization58 of 
 
 52. Vera Eidelman, The First Amendment Case for Public Access to Secret Algorithms 
Used in Criminal Trials, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 915, 938 (2018). 
 53. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980). 
 54. State v. Sanders, No. A-4350-16T6, 2017 WL 5495101, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Nov. 16, 2017). 
 55. Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. 
Sept. 13, 2016), modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 
1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018). 
 56. See HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 57. Citron, supra note 42, at 1252. 
 58. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New 
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 822 (2000) (distinguishing “contracting out” 
from privatization); Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service:  The Twentieth 
Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 859 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1274 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
decision-making are at the root of new challenges to algorithmic 
determinations. 
A note about methodology:  these cases and contexts were chosen because 
they keenly present the clash between vendors that provide algorithmic 
decision-making tools, governments that deploy such tools, private 
individuals who wish to challenge these outcomes, and the general public.  
Although the case law remains relatively scant, it was surprising to see the 
number of reported decisions that illustrate these structural dynamics 
prevalent in challenges to algorithmic opacity.  Nonetheless, this account is 
not exhaustive, and other cases likely exist that illustrate these patterns. 
Although this dynamic has garnered particular attention in the context of 
the criminal justice system,59 the proprietary nature of many algorithmic 
governance tools poses significant obstacles to individuals who seek to 
challenge algorithmic determinations in a variety of contexts.60  The precise 
substance of these disputes matters less than the overarching pattern:  these 
cases frequently present a clash of interests between government’s increasing 
reliance on proprietary tools, procured from private contractors or vendors, 
and transparency requirements. 
The clash between transparency and proprietary interests is particularly 
pronounced when individuals seek to challenge the outcomes of 
adjudications—whether judicial or administrative—that affect their civil 
rights and liberties.  Notably, however, the new challenges to algorithmic 
governance do not rise and fall on the substance of an algorithmic decision.  
Rather, the most successful challenges to algorithmic decision-making 
reflect demands for more information regarding the ways in which 
government is reaching its decisions:  in other words, demands for 
transparency and access to information about the process. 
A.  Medicaid 
Challenges to proprietary decision-making in the context of Medicaid are 
illustrative.  For years, lower courts have been dealing with procedural due 
process claims as state Medicaid agencies privatized their decision-making 
 
1367 (2003); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:  Accounting for the New 
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 6 (1988); see also Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE 
J. ON REG. 547, 590 (2016). 
 59. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”:  Explanatory Standards in the 
Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (2017); Jessica Gabel Cino, Deploying the 
Secret Police:  The Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1073 (2018); Aziz Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 
(2019); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019); Ram, supra note 
49; Roth, supra note 27; Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the 
Criminal Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067 (2018); Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based 
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014); 
Wexler, supra note 29. 
 60. See, e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13; Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 14; 
Katyal, supra note 38; Selbst & Barocas, supra note 38. 
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and began to use algorithmic methods to reduce recipients’ benefits.61  
Examining these cases makes clear that the shift toward algorithmic 
governance goes hand-in-hand with other measures that are intended to cut 
costs and have the (perhaps unintended) secondary effect of reducing 
accountability and transparency as well.  Agencies often rely on the 
“objectivity” or “efficiency” of their data-driven decision-making procedures 
to justify cost-cutting measures, such as terminating employees or cutting 
Medicaid benefits.62  But as agencies turn toward more “objective” decision-
making procedures, they often rely on private contractors who use 
proprietary, closed-source methods to make decisions about these 
constitutional rights.63 
The privatization and automation of decision-making regarding Medicaid 
benefits present clear tensions with principles of procedural due process.  
When individuals receive Medicaid or other public assistance benefits, those 
benefits are “treated as a form of ‘property.’”64  Consequently, Medicaid 
benefits cannot be reduced or terminated without satisfying certain 
safeguards set out in the Medicaid Act65 and the Constitution’s procedural 
due process guarantees.66 
These statutory and constitutional protections require the government to 
explain why and how it decided to terminate or reduce benefits.  Under 
federal Medicaid regulations, notices of terminations or reductions in 
benefits are required to contain “a clear statement of the specific reasons 
supporting the intended action.”67  Moreover, under the Medicaid Act, 
individuals must receive the opportunity for a “fair hearing” to challenge the 
denial of benefits.68  Any “termination, suspension, or reduction of” benefits 
 
 61. This move is perhaps best understood as a form of “bureaucratic disentitlement.” 
Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. 
REV. 3, 3 (1984) (defining “bureaucratic disentitlement” as a mode of “retrenchment” in which 
“obligations to social welfare beneficiaries are reduced and circumscribed through largely 
obscure ‘bureaucratic’ actions and inactions of public authorities”); see also VIRGINIA 
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY 49 (1st ed. 2018) (describing how Indiana privatized and 
automated its welfare systems in order to cut costs); Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement 
After Welfare Reform:  Are Fair Hearings the Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 13, 
13 (2005) (“One of the few avenues for challenging bureaucratic disentitlement is the fair 
hearing system.  However, little is known about how the fair hearing system is faring under 
welfare reform.”). 
 62. MEREDITH WHITTAKER ET AL., AI NOW INST., AI NOW REPORT 2018, at 18 (2018), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9CA-SYC8] (“Often 
adopted under the theory that they will improve government efficiency or cost-savings, 
[automated decision systems] seek to aid or replace various decision-making processes and 
policy determinations.”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985). 
 65. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 66. See Lewis v. Rendell, 501 F. Supp. 2d 671, 692 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding it “well 
established” that Medicaid recipients have a property interest in their benefits and collecting 
cases); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(3) (2018) (requiring a fair hearing under the Medicaid 
Act). 
 67. 42 C.F.R. § 431.210(b) (2019). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(3). 
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or eligibility triggers the statutory requirement for a hearing.69  In a separate 
provision of the Act, Congress also required state agencies to base Medicaid 
waiver budgets on a “methodology that uses valid, reliable cost data [which] 
is open to public inspection, and includes a calculation of the expected cost 
of such services.”70  Likewise, procedural due process requires agencies to 
employ “ascertainable standards” in decision-making.71 
These protections remain vital to prevent the wrongful termination of 
benefits, even as states have increasingly turned toward the private sector to 
provide various Medicaid services.  A 2006 Government Accountability 
Office report investigating the protection of personal health information 
found that 96 percent of state Medicaid agencies used vendors to perform 
various administrative services, including enrollment and benefits 
management.72  As states have turned to managed care organizations to 
administer benefits, private companies have become the primary providers 
of public Medicaid benefits in many states.73 
In turn, vendors have adopted a range of new algorithmic tools to help 
make the management of Medicaid more efficient.74  Yet new mechanisms 
for administering Medicaid have created tensions with constitutional and 
statutory demands of openness.  In 2015, a group of West Virginians with 
severe intellectual and developmental disabilities brought suit against the 
state’s Department of Health and Human Resources, challenging the state’s 
reliance on a proprietary algorithm to reduce critical Medicaid benefits.75  
The plaintiffs had received Medicaid waiver benefits for decades under the 
state’s home and community-based care program, which supported the 
 
 69. 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.201, 431.206(c). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(j)(5)(D). 
 71. Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 448 F.3d 392, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Holmes v. 
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 
(5th Cir. 1964). 
 72. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-676, DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE 
OUTSOURCING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION IN MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND TRICARE 9 (2006), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06676.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUL9-C9HQ]. 
 73. See Isaac D. Buck, Managing Medicaid, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107, 
111–12 (2017) (summarizing the status quo of Medicaid managed care); Vernon K. Smith et 
al., Medicaid Reforms to Expand Coverage, Control Costs and Improve Care:  Results from 
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FOUND. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-reforms-to-expand-
coverage-control-costs-and-improve-care-managed-care-reforms [https://perma.cc/TJ9X-
T7PM] (“Managed care is now the predominant delivery system for Medicaid in most 
states.”). 
 74. EUBANKS, supra note 61, at 52–53 (describing the results of Indiana’s decision to 
privatize and automate substantial aspects of its administration of benefits); see also Dave 
Stafford, Update:  IBM to Appeal $78M Breach of Contract Award to State, IND. LAW. (Aug. 
7, 2017), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/44441-update-ibm-to-appeal-78m-
breach-of-contract-award-to-state [https://perma.cc/TY38-GG9V] (summarizing litigation 
that ensued after Indiana terminated IBM’s contract). 
 75. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, Michael T. v. Bowling, 
No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016), ECF No. 14 [hereinafter 
First Amended Complaint]. 
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provision of key services that enabled them to live at home or in the 
community instead of being institutionalized.76 
These benefits were administered by a “waiver administrator,” APS 
Healthcare Inc., a private company tasked with allocating waiver benefits and 
generating budgets for the benefits and care for which the recipients were 
eligible.77  Under its contract, APS bore responsibility for annual assessments 
to measure recipients’ “abilities and needs,” to ensure that recipients of 
waiver funds were eligible to receive funds and to come up with a budget 
allocating benefits to each recipient.78  It did so by gathering data through 
interviews and “standard assessment tools” and then applying a proprietary 
algorithm that generated a budget to cover authorized waiver benefits.79 
The problem was that each year, the algorithm spat out a budget that 
appeared totally unrelated to the actual cost of providing the care which the 
plaintiffs required.80  APS sent letters to each recipient “notifying him or her 
of the budget amount without explanation as to how that number was 
determined.”81  In many cases, the algorithm-generated budget was slashed 
by tens of thousands of dollars from the year before.  But the plaintiffs’ 
conditions were stable; most of them had not improved in functionality or 
ability since they were teenagers, suggesting that, year over year, they would 
require roughly the same benefits and hours of services.82 
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs had little success in appealing to human 
decision makers to reverse the algorithm’s senseless, arbitrary, and 
unexplained reductions in benefits.  In boilerplate letters, APS contended that 
it could not exceed the “algorithm-generated budget.”83  The plaintiffs had 
no further success at the “fair hearings” required by the Medicaid Act.  Both 
the contractor and administrative judges were highly deferential to the 
algorithmic decision-making process, refusing to override—or even 
investigate—the algorithm’s conclusions.84 
The results were catastrophic.  One plaintiff, Tara R., a twenty-seven-year-
old woman who has “cerebral palsy, a severe intellectual disability, and 
limited hand functioning,” functioned at an “age equivalent of nine 
months.”85  She lived at home with her father and her disabled stepmother 
until 2014 when her benefits were cut from about $130,000 to about $72,000, 
making it impossible to keep her in her family home.  When the benefits were 
 
 76. See id. at 1–2. 
 77. Id. at 2. 
 78. Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. 
Sept. 13, 2016), modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 
1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018). 
 79. Id. 
 80. First Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at 11, 14, 19, 25. 
 81. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. 
Mar. 26, 2018). 
 82. First Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at 10, 13–14, 18, 24. 
 83. Id. at 12, 15–16, 20, 21. 
 84. Id. Exhibits 3–4, at 12–24 (rendering decisions in “fair hearings” that sought to 
challenge the budgets). 
 85. Id. at 29. 
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slashed, Tara was moved to an emergency care facility and then to a group 
home, where she became “lethargic” and “unwilling to engage with 
others.”86  Due to these changes, the plaintiffs alleged, Tara was at “serious 
risk of being institutionalized.”87 
The court rightly rejected this framework, agreeing with the plaintiffs that 
the APS algorithm could not satisfy the Constitution’s procedural due 
process requirements.88  Noting that the government had provided “no 
information as to what factors are incorporated into the APS Algorithm, how 
each factor is weighted, or the overarching methodology APS utilizes,” the 
court faulted APS for failing to employ “ascertainable standards” in making 
their determinations.89  Moreover, APS had failed to even include “any 
individualized rationale” for the budgets allocated to the plaintiffs, making it 
impossible for plaintiffs to “meaningfully challenge” the budgets.90  
Concerned that the “lack of transparency” in the algorithm rendered the 
determinations “potentially rudderless,” the district court concluded that the 
APS decision-making process created an “unacceptable risk of arbitrary and 
‘erroneous deprivation[s].’”91 
But these problems were not irresolvable.  While the court enjoined the 
department from continuing to use the APS algorithm, it reasoned that 
requiring the state to develop a decision-making methodology that actually 
used ascertainable standards would not impose an undue “fiscal or 
administrative” burden.92  In response, West Virginia developed a new 
system that replaced the proprietary APS algorithm with “matrices 
employing a number of clearly identified variables based on a combination 
of a member’s living situation and answers to specific questions during the 
member’s annual assessment.”93  The state promised that the matrix would 
be “publicly available” and that recipients would be able to challenge both 
the accuracy of the static factors that constituted inputs into the matrix and 
the application of the matrix itself.94  Concluding that the new system 
sufficiently remedied the due process flaws in the APS algorithm, the court 
lifted the injunction.95 
Secretive determinations about benefit eligibility have widespread 
implications for a range of other interests, including those of other 
beneficiaries, possible future beneficiaries, their attorneys and social 
 
 86. Id. at 32–33. 
 87. Id. at 34. 
 88. Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. 
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workers, and even state and federal taxpayers.  But West Virginia is hardly 
alone in resisting disclosure of these decision-making methods.  A similar 
case arising in Idaho makes plain the clash between privatized and automated 
governance on the one hand and due process guarantees on the other.96  Like 
the West Virginia plaintiffs, the Idaho plaintiffs challenged the state’s use of 
a proprietary, secret methodology to determine their individual budgets for 
home and community-based waiver benefits.97  The state offered a 
compromise:  it would disclose the methodology to the plaintiffs, but only if 
they assented to a confidentiality agreement that provided that the “details of 
the budget-setting methodology . . . may not be discussed or revealed to 
anyone, in any manner, except for purposes of administrative appeal and 
judicial review.”98 
Idaho’s position that its methodology was a “trade secret” ran headlong 
into its statutory obligation to use a methodology that was “open to public 
inspection.”99  The parties—and the court—ultimately rejected this attempt 
to shield the methodology from public disclosure.100  Instead, after some 
back-and-forth, the parties stipulated to a preliminary injunction that the 
agency would make the budget-calculating tool, as well as a range of 
supporting documents necessary to understand the tool, available to 
participants in the waiver program upon request.101  In addition, the 
department promised to make most of the same materials available to 
members of the public under Idaho public records laws.102 
Though Idaho’s attempt at a compromise ultimately failed, its invocation 
of trade secrecy exemplifies a troubling trend in approaches to algorithmic 
accountability.  Idaho’s offer to make the information available to plaintiffs, 
subject to a gag order that prevented them from discussing the methodology, 
typifies what I call “atomized disclosure”—an approach that seeks to solve 
due process problems by disclosing information to the affected parties, but 
only on the condition that they not further disclose it.  For the reasons 
discussed in Part IV, atomized disclosure is highly problematic:  it creates 
serious First Amendment concerns, public policy issues, and inefficiencies. 
B.  Education 
Proprietary algorithmic governance has invited due process challenges in 
other sectors as well.  As school systems have attempted to become more 
 
 96. See generally K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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accountable, they have turned toward data-driven tools to measure 
educational outcomes and improve educational effectiveness.103  These tools 
have altered educational practices at all levels of the school system, 
transforming how teachers engage students in the classroom,104 how states 
rate school performance,105 and how districts measure progress.106  As in the 
context of Medicaid privatization, the mechanisms of data-driven education 
reform are also often privately developed, further entrenching private power 
in classroom teaching, assessment, and data collection itself.107  These new 
practices are also occurring within the political context of a push for “free-
market” reforms that map the practices of for-profit businesses onto public 
institutions.108 
“Value-added assessment” reflects this push toward data-driven education 
policy.  Value-added assessments, or “value-added measures,” assess teacher 
quality by examining and tracking student test scores in order to measure the 
effect that teachers have on student performance over time.109  Value-added 
 
 103. See, e.g., DARRELL M. WEST, BROOKINGS, BIG DATA FOR EDUCATION:  DATA MINING, 
DATA ANALYTICS, AND WEB DASHBOARDS 1, 9 (2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
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LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM 199–200 (2010) (describing how private 
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assessments are used beyond classroom teaching as well:  they can also shed 
light on the soundness of teacher education itself.110 
Like privatization in health care, value-added assessments also purport to 
be a more “objective” way to cut costs in a financially precarious 
environment.  Budget shortfalls in school districts across America have 
prompted some districts to lay off teachers.111  Vividly invoking the language 
of private enterprise, a 2001 report supportive of value-added measures 
compared educational systems to other businesses, writing, “[M]anagers in 
most industries would attempt to target layoffs so as to cause as little damage 
as possible to productivity—less productive workers would be dismissed or 
furloughed before more productive workers.”112 
Teachers’ unions have been at the forefront of efforts to resist these 
transformations and have fought against district efforts to cut costs by 
terminating teachers who do not measure up in “value-added” terms.  A 
recent case from Houston, Texas—one of the largest school districts in the 
country113—illustrates a successful union-led effort to end the district’s 
reliance on “privately developed algorithms” to determine whether public 
school teachers were “ineffective” and should be terminated.114  Just as in 
the Medicaid cases, the case concerned the outsourcing of government 
services to a private company that employed proprietary algorithms to make 
critical decisions that implicated due process rights.115 
The Houston Independent School District (HISD) had contracted with 
SAS, a private company that developed a “value-added statistical model” 
known as the Educational Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS), to 
aid in evaluating teacher effectiveness.116  Teachers who have tenure, or who 
are employed under “continuing contracts,” have a “property interest in 
continued employment.”117  But HISD made it a goal to “exit” its 
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FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_215.30.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/Q6FD-MF2P] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 114. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 115. See generally id. 
 116. Id. at 1172. 
 117. Id. at 1173.  Cf. Trout v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 163 F. Supp. 3d 492, 507 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2016) (upholding the use of a proprietary algorithmic teacher evaluation model to deny 
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“ineffective” teachers and to retain only those who showed sufficient student 
growth, as measured by the EVAAS.118 
The new policy resulted in the dismissal of at least twelve teachers on 
continuing contracts.119  But because of the proprietary nature of the EVAAS 
algorithm, the teachers and school district lacked sufficient information to 
understand how the program functioned.120  The teachers and the union who 
challenged the program described it as “complex and opaque.”121  Because 
SAS treated the software and algorithms as “trade secrets” and refused to 
divulge them, not even HISD had access to them.122 
Like the Medicaid cases, the HISD case presented a significant conflict 
between the plaintiffs’ desire to access information about how the EVAAS 
methodology functioned, the claimed interest in secrecy, and the public 
interest.  In the course of discovery, the parties negotiated a framework 
through which SAS would disclose certain trade secrets—including the 
source code, models, and methodologies for the EVAAS—to the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and experts on an “attorney eyes only” basis.123  The court entered 
a protective order that provided, in part, that none of the protected 
information could be disclosed to anyone outside the scope of the 
litigation.124  Shortly after the court entered the protective order, the 
plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jesse Rothstein, inspected the source code for 
EVAAS.125  He then prepared an expert report which concluded, in part, that 
teachers could not “meaningfully verify” their EVAAS scores.126 
The teachers’ union posted a litigation update on its website referring to 
Dr. Rothstein’s report.127  SAS promptly filed a motion for contempt and for 
sanctions, complaining that the blog post—which concededly contained none 
of the company’s trade secrets or other proprietary information—violated the 
protective order because it could only have been written based on Dr. 
Rothstein’s “observations [and]/or conclusions” of EVAAS.128  In SAS’s 
view, the protective order meant to “prevent Plaintiffs and all of Plaintiffs’ 
 
bonuses because “an employee performance evaluation is not a sufficient property interest to 
invoke procedural due process protections”). 
 118. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1174–75. 
 119. Id. at 1175. 
 120. Id. at 1176 (finding that teachers lack access to “the computer algorithms and data 
necessary to verify the accuracy of their scores”). 
 121. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at 14–15, HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-
cv-01189), ECF No. 23. 
 122. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. 
 123. See generally Protective Order over SAS Institute Inc. Information, HISD, 251 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-cv-01189), ECF No. 47-1. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Order at 3, HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-cv-01189), ECF No. 59. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See generally Exhibit C, HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-cv-01189), ECF No. 
54-3. 
 128. SAS Institute Inc.’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Interpretation of Protective 
Order and Motion for Contempt at 5, HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-cv-01189), ECF 
No. 54 (alteration in original). 
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experts from continuing any public discourse against EVAAS.”129  The court 
rejected SAS’s “overly broad interpretation,” finding that, if adopted, it 
would “inhibit legitimate discussion about the lawsuit” among union 
members and among the general public.130 
The court was equally suspicious of SAS’s secrecy claims on the merits 
and agreed that relying on a secret algorithm, the outcome of which the 
plaintiffs could not challenge, raised serious procedural due process 
concerns.131  Most significantly, the methodology could not establish the 
reason for a teacher’s dismissal “in sufficient detail so as to enable him to 
show any error that may exist.”132  Those concerns were not remediated by 
HISD’s effort to make available general information about the EVAAS 
methodology.133  As in the West Virginia case, the court agreed with the 
plaintiffs that the use of a secret, proprietary methodology would make it 
impossible for the affected party to raise a meaningful challenge at a hearing. 
This did not mean that the court would require SAS to disclose its trade 
secrets—the court recognized that the plaintiffs could not constitutionally 
“put SAS out of business.”134  But if the methodology was unconstitutional, 
the policy likely had to be overturned.  A few months after the court denied 
the school district’s motion for summary judgment, the district settled with 
the union, abandoning EVAAS and paying the union’s attorney’s fees.135 
C.  Criminal Law Enforcement 
1.  Policing 
Proprietary algorithmic governance is widespread in policing.136  Consider 
the example of the gunshot detection company ShotSpotter:  the service, 
which is employed by over ninety jurisdictions across the country, uses 
sensors to discern the sound of gunfire and triangulate its location, pushing a 
notification to emergency services.137  Cities subscribe to ShotSpotter’s 
services; the company installs the sensors, and the city receives the 
notifications from the company’s software.138  But ShotSpotter has often 
taken the view that the data it generates about where gunshots occur is a 
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 136. See Jonathan Manes, Secrecy & Evasion in Police Surveillance Technology, 34 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 503 (2019).  See generally Ram, supra note 49. 
 137. ShotSpotter Technology, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/technology 
[https://perma.cc/2W3F-ASNW] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 138. Id. 
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proprietary trade secret.139  In one letter, Forbes reported, ShotSpotter’s CEO 
emphasized the company’s position that its data “is not crime data”140 at all. 
When journalists and researchers began requesting the data from police, 
ShotSpotter sent out a “nationwide memo” urging cities not to disclose it.141  
ShotSpotter—and some municipalities—took the position that, pursuant to 
contract, the data was not a matter of public record.142  As a result, 
researchers were limited to analyzing data from the handful of jurisdictions 
that released it—over ShotSpotter’s objections—or purchased it directly 
from ShotSpotter.143 
2.  Bail 
Proprietary decision-making is also of increasing relevance in criminal 
prosecutions.  Algorithmic governance is the topic of significant interest in 
the context of pretrial release determinations, partially prompted by a 
nationwide reckoning with the injustice of cash bail.  Over the last several 
years, a surge in activism by community bail funds, lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of money bail,144 and legislative reconsideration of money 
bail145 have substantially shifted the conversation about pretrial detention.  In 
one report, a California working group on pretrial detention reform pointedly 
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reminded its readers, “The United States is one of only two countries that 
allow for-profit bail bonding; the other is the Philippines.”146 
The move toward algorithmic governance builds on a long history of 
quantitative, actuarial measures to assess the risk that specific criminal 
defendants might pose to society.147  These “actuarial risk assessment 
instruments” (ARAIs) have also been deployed in the context of pretrial 
release decisions, sentencing, parole, and determinations of sexually violent 
predator status, to name a few.148  Contemporary ARAIs hold substantial 
promise to reduce overincarceration by making more accurate decisions 
about who poses a potential risk to society.149  This need is particularly 
pronounced in the contexts of pretrial release and bail:  many pretrial 
detainees are at low risk of committing violent offenses if they are 
released.150  Detaining individuals simply because they cannot afford to pay 
bail is unjust, unconstitutional,151 and expensive.152 
In light of these realizations, cities, counties, and states are adopting new 
decision-making tools—building on the older generation of ARAIs—to help 
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determine whether a pretrial detainee actually poses a risk to public safety if 
released.153  The new generation of risk assessment tools has been heralded 
as providing an “unbiased, objective evaluation of the risks that defendants 
pose to society.”154  This focus on objectivity comes as no surprise:  social 
scientists have long argued that actuarial risk assessment is both more 
objective and more accurate than human decision-making.155  Indeed, 
actuarial assessments may well be more accurate than “clinical” judgment, 
which relies on the “professional judgment of the reviewer” to determine 
potential future risk.156  Clinical judgment is “crude and subjective”157 and 
prone to human error.158 
But state legislatures and court systems that adopt new risk assessment 
tools frequently procure them from foundations or the private sector, raising 
questions about transparency.  The Arnold Foundation, for example, provides 
its “Public Safety Assessment” free of charge to jurisdictions that adopt it—
but it compels them to enter into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
that stipulates that they will not treat the tool like an ordinary public record 
for purposes of freedom of information laws.159  Unlike ShotSpotter, the 
Arnold Foundation’s MOU expressly indicates that the foundation has no 
property interest in the data “provided by” these jurisdictions.160  But the 
MOU also provides that the foundation retains “all right, title and interest 
(including patents, copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks) in and to the 
Tool.”161 
3.  Evidence 
Evidence generated using proprietary methods also occupies a central role 
at trial.162  Take, for example, the common use of breathalyzer evidence to 
demonstrate that a DUI defendant was, indeed, under the influence.  Several 
companies manufacture breathalyzers, or “breath test machines,” including 
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Dräger163 (which makes the AlcoTest 9510) and Intoxilyzer.164  Defendants 
in dozens of state courts have sought discovery of the source code of these 
tools, arguing that expert analysis of the source code is essential to be able to 
confront the evidence against them.165  But many courts have concluded that 
the prosecution does not “possess” the source code because it is owned by 
the private vendor.166 
When the vendors have disclosed the source code, it is frequently subject 
to an expansive protective order.  For instance, Dräger has disclosed source 
code in multiple criminal proceedings, pursuant to a protective order.167  But 
when two defense experts who had examined the code presented a report 
describing its flaws at an annual convention of DUI lawyers in 2017, the 
company sent them a cease-and-desist letter, contending that the allegations 
were defamatory and violated the order—despite the fact that the report did 
not contain any of the source code itself.168  The experts ultimately settled 
with Dräger, although some defense attorneys believed the company was 
interpreting its protective order too broadly.169 
Defendants’ experiences with DNA evidence are equally instructive.  
Courts in numerous jurisdictions have admitted DNA analyses generated by 
proprietary software, without disclosing the source code to the defendants.170  
In New York City, for example, the city’s crime lab—the Office of the Chief 
Medical Examiner (OCME)—developed its own probabilistic genotyping 
tool, the Forensic Statistical Tool (FST).171  The FST worked by generating 
a “likelihood ratio” to estimate the probability that a given contributor’s DNA 
was present in a mixed sample.172 
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Despite the OCME’s extensive use of the FST, the office never disclosed 
the source code to a single defendant until Kevin Johnson was prosecuted in 
federal court.173  Johnson was arrested in 2015 after an apartment search 
turned up two guns.  OCME used the FST to analyze the samples of DNA 
obtained from the guns, concluding that it was 156 times more likely than 
not that one of the guns contained Johnson’s DNA.  When Johnson requested 
access to the FST source code for expert analysis and review, the government 
refused to comply, arguing that the FST was “proprietary and 
copyrighted.”174  After a discovery battle, the court concluded that the source 
code had to be turned over to the defense expert,175 who reviewed the code 
and concluded that its accuracy should be “seriously questioned.”176 
Despite the significance of the expert’s conclusions—which cast doubt on 
the thousands of cases in which FST evidence had been used—his report 
remained under wraps.  In order to facilitate discovery, the parties agreed to 
a protective order under which the source code was designated as “Highly 
Confidential Material.”177  Accordingly, the report was filed on the docket, 
but many of its findings remained inaccessible until a nonprofit news outlet, 
ProPublica, filed a motion to intervene, vacate the protective order, and 
unseal the source code.178  After ProPublica intervened, the city dropped its 
claim that the code was proprietary and released it to the reporter, who 
published it, prompting a public discussion.179 
4.  Sentencing 
Sentencing proceedings are also being transformed by algorithmic 
governance.  In a now-infamous case, a defendant raised a due process 
challenge to the use at sentencing of a proprietary algorithmic risk assessment 
tool called the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions (COMPAS).180  COMPAS, which was developed by the 
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Northpointe Institute for Public Management, is an actuarial risk assessment 
tool.181  COMPAS weighs a number of factors, such as criminal history, 
education, employment, age, and substance abuse history and generates “risk 
scores” intended to predict the likelihood of pretrial recidivism, general 
recidivism, and violent recidivism.182 
Eric Loomis challenged the use of COMPAS at his sentencing on due 
process grounds, analogizing the instrument to a presentence investigation 
report that must be disclosed to the defendant.183  But Northpointe 
“consider[ed] COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade secret” and 
contended that its source code could not be disclosed.184  Without access to 
information about how the COMPAS tool functions, Loomis argued, its 
accuracy was questionable.185 
The court took a middle road.  Loomis had an “opportunity to verify” that 
the inputs into COMPAS—answers to questions about his criminal history, 
for example—were accurate.186  But several studies had suggested that the 
tool was biased and potentially inaccurate.187  The court held that, because 
of these ambiguities about the tool’s accuracy, the sentencing court must be 
notified regarding both the proprietary nature of the tool and its potential 
inaccuracies.188  One judge wrote in a separate concurrence to clarify, 
however, that even taking these limitations into account, it would be 
impermissible for the court to “rely” on COMPAS at sentencing; at most, 
COMPAS scores could be only “one of many factors” considered.189 
Even the most avid supporters of risk assessment are skeptical of the use 
of proprietary methods for these purposes; they are concerned that vendors 
may not disclose important information or that the profit motive might lead 
them to overstate the value of their contributions.190  These concerns about 
transparency are coupled with additional substantive questions about how the 
tools actually function:  for instance, do algorithmic decision-making 
mechanisms consider race or gender in ways that might violate the 
Constitution or principles of due process?  Do evidence-generating tools like 
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breathalyzers malfunction under certain conditions?191  And if so, how will 
defendants—or the public—know? 
II.  ALGORITHMIC OPACITY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
In 2002, Martha Minow wrote that what “American schools, prisons, 
welfare agencies, and social service programs have in common” is that they 
are the subject of expanding experiments in privatization.192  Seventeen years 
later, these seemingly disparate contexts are united not only as sites of 
privatization but also as experiments in automation and algorithmic 
governance.  In important respects, these cases reflect the many ways in 
which outsourcing decision-making to the private sector can pose challenges 
to existing transparency and accountability mechanisms.193  Partnerships 
between government and the private sector in Medicaid, education, and 
criminal justice are transforming the way that government makes critical 
decisions that affect individual rights as well as the broader public. 
A.  Concealing Government Decision-Making 
First, algorithmic governance amplifies some recurring problems for 
procedural due process, with widespread effects.  Bureaucracy and red tape 
all but ensure that the reasons and procedures for government decisions are 
difficult to access even when humans, not machines, are in control.194  But 
by automating decision-making and resisting disclosure of its methods, 
algorithmic governance poses more entrenched obstacles to litigants’ 
abilities to “meaningfully challenge” determinations, limiting the types of 
information that the government could disclose to affected citizens.195  Thus, 
when government defendants assert that their decision-making 
methodologies cannot be disclosed because of trade secret concerns, they in 
turn attempt to minimize the importance of the methodology—or emphasize 
its objectivity—in understanding how the government reached the contested 
decision. 
In all these cases, by contrast, the courts recognized that due process 
requires litigants to have access to some information about the decision-
making process.  But what information specifically?  The courts lack a 
benchmark for understanding what kinds of information litigants actually 
require to make the possibility of a “meaningful challenge” a reality.  This 
 
 191. Whittaker, supra note 167. 
 192. Minow, supra note 58, at 1229. 
 193. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, 
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:  OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 291, 299 (Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (observing that, “with expanding privatization, private 
entities increasingly are undertaking adjudications on behalf of the government”). 
 194. Cf. Lens, supra note 61, at 16–19 (describing how both the “social work” and the 
“legal” models of determining eligibility for welfare benefits resulted in arbitrary and 
discriminatory denials of aid). 
 195. Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. 
Sept. 13, 2016), modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 
1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018). 
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determination may depend partially on the design and intended use of an 
algorithmic governance method.196  But some crosscutting questions have 
yet to be resolved, including whether individuals should have access to 
information about how the methodology functions or only to the data that 
constitutes an input into the system. 
Accordingly, some courts have suggested that access to the “static factors” 
inputted into an automated system is sufficient to vindicate due process 
rights.  Thus, in State v. Loomis,197 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the 
use of COMPAS in part because the defendant had access to questions and 
answers regarding “static factors” such as his criminal history.198  But other 
courts have required more, recognizing that access to additional information 
about the decision-making process was critical to understanding how the 
government reached the outcomes that the plaintiffs wished to challenge.199  
And in Houston Federation of Teachers, Local 2145 v. Houston Independent 
School District200 (HISD), the court seemed to follow this more demanding 
approach, reasoning that access to general information about the EVAAS 
methodology was insufficient to alleviate due process concerns.201 
In short, these decisions are uniform in holding that the law requires the 
disclosure of information necessary to understand whether an automated 
decision is accurate but differ in their determinations of what that 
information is.  In a sense, this observation comports with the courts’ general 
embrace of “flexible” procedures that can accommodate different substantive 
contexts.202 
But if technology and privatization are altering decision-making 
methodologies in ways that cut across sectors, perhaps a more coherent and 
affirmative approach is needed to determine what kinds of information about 
algorithmic systems ought to be disclosed.203  Litigation that is fact-specific, 
occurs on a case-by-case basis and ultimately advances the interests of (and 
strikes compromises among) private parties may not be the most efficient, or 
effective, strategy for advancing algorithmic accountability.  The 
“flexibility” of the due process inquiry, in other words, may undermine 
 
 196. See, e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 120–22 (describing the importance 
of understanding the risk of false positives and negatives, particularly in criminal justice 
contexts). 
 197. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
 198. Id. at 761. 
 199. Thus, in Michael T. v. Crouch, the revised approach to determining eligibility for 
Medicaid waiver benefits allowed beneficiaries to challenge not only the accuracy of the 
inputs but also the application of the decision-making methodology itself. See generally No. 
2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018). 
 200. 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 201. Id. at 1178. 
 202. O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 806 (1980). 
 203. See, e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 166 (“Governments should 
consciously generate—or demand that their vendors generate—records that will further public 
understanding of algorithmic processes.”). 
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efforts to shed light on the extent to which decision-making across agencies 
is shifting from public toward private governance.204 
B.  The Role of Human Judgment 
These cases also raise significant questions about the role of deference and 
human judgment in considering—and potentially reversing—algorithmic 
decisions.  Courts appear more skeptical of algorithmic determinations when 
proprietary tools are accepted and relied upon as the primary or exclusive 
factor in decision-making.205  By contrast, courts appear more likely to bless 
proprietary algorithmic governance where an algorithmic determination is 
only one of many factors to be considered.206 
The relationship between human discretion and technological tools is of 
central concern because reliance on technology might change the ways in 
which decision makers give reasons for their decisions as well as the 
outcomes themselves.207  As Danielle Citron has demonstrated, “automation 
bias” suggests that “workers will likely adopt a computer’s suggested 
eligibility determinations and benefit calculations.”208  These cases tend to 
support Citron’s observation, confirming that “fair hearings” are less than 
fair when hearing officers defer unthinkingly to algorithmic determinations.  
As the HISD court wrote, it “beggars belief that any HISD hearing officer 
would (or could) freely disregard the very score used by HISD to identify 
‘ineffective’ teachers.”209  Likewise, the court in Michael T. v. Crouch210 
found that, despite West Virginia’s “stated policy” to increase benefits 
beyond the budget allocated by the APS algorithm, it had “eschew[ed] this 
policy in favor of affirming” the outcome of the algorithmic 
determination.211 
Nonetheless, some studies show more complex interactions between 
human decision makers and algorithmic determinations.  For instance, 
 
 204. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 101 (2011); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 576 (2000) (“[M]any scholars have argued that, in certain contexts, private actors 
ought to submit to oversight by agencies, courts, and the legislature, and to be constrained by 
the Constitution in the same manner as traditional public agencies are.”); Margaret H. Lemos, 
Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515 (2016) (describing public sector reliance on 
private attorneys); Metzger, supra note 58 (analyzing the extent of privatization in 
nondelegation terms). 
 205. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769–71 (Wis. 2016) (upholding the use 
of proprietary risk assessment because the state’s practices did not give the risk scores “undue 
weight”). 
 206. See, e.g., id. at 772–74 (Roggensack, J., concurring) (supporting the use of algorithmic 
determinations in contexts in which decision makers are already required to weigh multiple 
factors). 
 207. See Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
1277, 1338 (2018) (arguing that machine learning ought to be deployed in “high-discretion” 
environments). 
 208. Citron, supra note 42, at 1272. 
 209. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1180 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 210. No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018). 
 211. Id. at *3. 
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algorithmic decisions on “human tasks” such as hiring are perceived as less 
“fair” and less “trustworthy” than human judgment, suggesting that some 
decision makers might ignore or discount them.212  One study of judicial 
attitudes toward risk assessment in sentencing found that a minority of judges 
believed risk assessment to be more accurate than human judgment.213  In a 
recent study of pretrial risk assessment in Kentucky, Megan Stevenson found 
that the use of an actuarial risk assessment tool did not markedly increase 
efficiency.214  One potential reason, she found, was that “judicial discretion 
was used not to correct the risk assessment when it erred, but to override the 
risk assessment when it was correct.”215  As one scholar recently predicted 
with regard to criminal law enforcement, negative media coverage might also 
lead to more public resistance to algorithmic outcomes “since the general 
public will inevitably see the failures of predictive algorithms along with 
their successes.”216 
These factors complicate, rather than clarify, the role of decision-maker 
discretion.  They make it more difficult to attribute an outcome to a specific 
decision maker or process and to understand the basis of government 
decisions.  One potential result is that the advent of algorithmic decision-
making—while promising enhanced objectivity and efficiency—actually 
introduces more, not less, uncertainty into the logic of governing.  This 
uncertainty is material not only to the individuals who seek to understand 
why they have been denied important rights and benefits but also to the public 
as a whole. 
C.  Process and Results 
Perhaps the greatest question raised by these challenges to algorithmic 
governance concerns the relationship between process and outcomes.217  
Numerous scholars have raised pressing concerns that algorithmic 
 
 212. See Min Kyung Lee, Understanding Perception of Algorithmic Decisions:  Fairness, 
Trust, and Emotion in Response to Algorithmic Management, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 
2018, at 8, 14; see also Mary T. Dzindolet et al., The Role of Trust in Automation Reliance, 
58 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 697, 697–718 (2003).  In one recent study of public sector 
users of machine learning technologies outside the United States, some respondents suggested 
that a lack of transparency in machine learning could hamper adoption, use, or trust in the 
system. Michael Veale, Max Van Kleek & Reuben Binns, Fairness and Accountability Design 
Needs for Algorithmic Support in High-Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making, CHI ’18: 
PROC. 2018 CHI CONF. HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYSTEMS, Apr. 2018, at 1. 
 213. See generally Jordan M. Hyatt & Steven L. Chanenson, The Use of Risk Assessment 
at Sentencing:  Implications for Research and Policy (Villanova Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 2017-1040, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961288 [https://perma.cc/ 
2994-PWKZ]. 
 214. See generally Stevenson, supra note 149. 
 215. Id. at 369. 
 216. Simmons, supra note 59, at 1093. 
 217. See generally Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A 
Plea for ‘Process Values,’ 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974) (defending “process values”). 
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governance—in the private as well as the public sector—can lead to faulty, 
discriminatory, or biased outcomes.218 
Notably, however, these successful challenges to proprietary algorithmic 
governance in the public sector have not concerned bias or unfairness in the 
outcomes of automated processes but rather interests in a fair process.  In 
several cases, these courts explicitly refused to consider whether an 
algorithm itself was “systematically biased.”219  Rather, to the extent that 
litigants have been successful in efforts to curb algorithmic decision-making, 
these successes are not about degrees of bias or fairness embedded within a 
tool.  They reflect interests in the kinds of transparency and access that due 
process requires.  Of course, transparency is also a prerequisite for 
understanding whether algorithmic governance indeed offends substantive 
rights. 
But transparency is as important for reasons of process as for substance.  
In fact, these cases may be better viewed through the lens of procedural 
values such as transparency, participation, and democratic accountability 
than through the lens of discrimination or bias.  This is not just because the 
resolution of these cases rises or falls on judgments about the quality and 
kind of information required to be disclosed to affected parties but rather that 
the cases can be seen as advancing procedural justice.220  As scholars of 
procedural justice acknowledge, the substantive fairness of government 
decision-making matters as much as the appearance of fairness in promoting 
public trust and legitimacy.221 
As governments adopt automated decision-making systems, they ought to 
consider not only the substance of those decisions but also how those 
transformations in governance affect public control, trust, and democratic 
oversight.  This observation comports with the general understanding that 
governmental processes ought to be transparent, comprehensible, and 
predictable.222  The interests in “predictability, transparency, and rationality” 
 
 218. See, e.g., Rachel Courtland, Bias Detectives:  The Researchers Striving to Make 
Algorithms Fair, NATURE (June 20, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-
05469-3 [https://perma.cc/AW8W-RW3H]; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28; Citron, 
supra note 42; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 29; Huq, supra note 59; Katyal, supra note 38; 
Mayson, supra note 59; Starr, supra note 59. 
 219. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1180 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process argument that EVAAS was not “rational” because it was 
“systematically biased”); see also State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 764 (Wis. 2016) 
(endorsing “cautions” on the use of risk assessment without explicitly finding that the tools 
encoded bias). 
 220. See generally Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?:  Criteria Used by Citizens 
to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988). 
 221. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of 
Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 525, 535 (2014) (“Many judges devote their 
attention to being fair, i.e., to correctly applying the law to the facts of each case, but do not 
think about how they can communicate that they are being fair to the parties in the case or to 
the public more generally.”). 
 222. See Mashaw, supra note 18; Redish & Marshall, supra note 18; Saphire, supra note 
18, at 116 (“A purely piecemeal, incremental definition of fairness would be at odds with the 
view that fairness can or should have some guiding influence on the way in which persons or 
institutions should be expected to act.”). 
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are not only essential for vindicating individuals’ interest in understanding 
the legal rules that bind them but also for informing society about the laws 
that exist and how they are applied.223 
III.  ACCESS LAW FOR AN OPAQUE AGE 
Challenges to algorithmic decision-making teach a valuable lesson:  
knowledge is power.  In efforts to confront algorithmic decision-making, the 
first step is nearly always an arduous journey to shed light on why, and how, 
the decision was reached in the first instance.  Even within a traditional 
procedural due process framework, litigants have repeatedly raised issues 
regarding transparency of government decision-making that affect the 
public.224 
New challenges to transparency and accountability also resonate within 
the broader framework of the law of access to government proceedings and 
records, which is preoccupied with opening government decision-making to 
public view.  This Article now turns toward the law of access itself to 
examine how the guarantees of public records statutes and the constitutional 
right of access to government proceedings might advance efforts to bring 
algorithmic governance into public view.  Critically, neither mechanism 
provides clear solutions to the challenge of proprietary algorithmic 
governance.  Nonetheless, both sources call into question the adoption of 
proprietary tools to shield government decision-making from public view.225 
A.  Why Access Law? 
These cases raise a conceptual question:  when ought the methodology of 
government decision-making be public?  This question has deep practical 
implications.  If the processes for government decision-making were already 
public, litigants would not have to fight tooth and nail to gain access to an 
explanation of why their benefits were slashed, their employment was 
terminated, or their release from prison was delayed. 
The challenges to algorithmic opacity surveyed in the preceding sections 
are efforts to facilitate access to information critical to individuals affected 
by algorithmic governance.  In light of these modest successes for the 
interests of algorithmic justice, what more could the law of access add? 
The law of access makes a critical contribution in shifting the burden to 
force disclosure from those who are directly affected to the general public.  
To date, most of the challenges to algorithmic opacity have been brought by 
 
 223. Redish & Marshall, supra note 18, at 485. 
 224. See supra Part I.A (describing the Idaho plaintiffs’ rejection of a protective order); 
supra Part I.B (describing the HISD protective order). 
 225. See, e.g., DIAKOPOULOS, supra note 33, at 12. 
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litigants who are typically underresourced:  criminal defendants,226 the poor 
and disabled,227 and public servants.228 
Nowhere is this dynamic more obvious than in the context of Medicaid 
waiver determinations.  Although these cases have received hardly any 
scholarly attention,229 they have deep significance for the study of 
algorithmic governance.  The Medicaid cases reflect how algorithmic 
governance often affects the least privileged, least empowered members of 
society, who are often represented by overstretched and underresourced legal 
aid organizations:  in this case, the disabled. 
Yet implicit in these cases is an acknowledgment that this information also 
has broader implications for the public’s right to know.  In K.W. ex rel. D.W. 
v. Armstrong,230 that claim was made explicit:  the decision-making 
methodology had to be disclosed not only to the plaintiffs but also to any 
other interested person using the mechanism of Idaho’s public records law.  
The reasons are clear:  although there were only a few plaintiffs, the 
methodology should be available to all beneficiaries and their guardians, 
regardless of whether they were represented in the case.  Moreover, K.W. 
reflects a broader understanding:  in all of these cases, even if individual 
litigants had sufficient information to challenge the individual determinations 
that affected their rights, the public would still be largely in the dark. 
This public interest in understanding how proprietary algorithmic 
governance works is precisely what is protected by laws requiring public 
access to government records and proceedings.  This interest is independent 
from that of the litigants.  Indeed, in many cases seeking to vindicate the right 
of access to government proceedings, the public intervenes in an ongoing 
case notwithstanding the opposition of both parties.231  Under open records 
 
 226. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari & Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma 
Pauperis, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-6387) (establishing 
that Loomis was represented by pro bono counsel Michael D. Rosenberg of Community 
Justice, Inc.). 
 227. See, e.g., K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015); Michael T. 
v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016), 
modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.W. 
Va. Mar. 26, 2018); see also Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336, 345 
(Ark. 2017) (holding that the Arkansas Department of Human Services violated the state’s 
Administrative Procedure Act by failing to provide Medicaid waiver recipients with notice of 
new automated methodology for benefits determinations). 
 228. See generally HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 229. Only a handful of scholarly sources discuss these cases. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & 
Jason Schultz, AI Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1941, 1948–52 (2019); 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Common Law for the Age of Artificial Intelligence:  
Incremental Adjudication, Institutions, and Relational Non-Arbitrariness, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1773, 1784 n.31 (2019). 
 230. 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 231. See, e.g., United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] motion to 
intervene to assert the public’s First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is 
proper.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Soussoudis (In re Wash. Post Co.), 807 F.2d 383, 
386–87 (4th Cir. 1986) (permitting the Washington Post to intervene for purposes of 
challenging the closure of a sentencing hearing to which defendant had not objected); United 
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statutes, transparency advocates frequently seek records that implicate 
individual privacy rights.232  This public-oriented framework acknowledges 
that, at times, the public’s interests in transparency and openness may 
contradict the preferences of the parties in litigation. 
This disjunction between the interests of private litigants and the public 
interest has practical roots.  Private litigants often lack a reason to push for 
public disclosure of records concerning algorithmic decision-making.  
Sometimes secrecy redounds to a litigant’s benefit by protecting key privacy 
interests.233  In the criminal context, pushing for public disclosure might 
heighten the possibility that others would learn of a criminal proceeding, thus 
creating more significant collateral consequences by tipping off future 
employers, landlords, or business associates or by revealing cooperation with 
law enforcement investigations.234  In the civil context, pushing for public 
disclosure also runs counter to statutes that protect individual medical 
privacy or that shield against disclosure of employment records.235 
More important, as a normative matter, individual litigants should not have 
to shoulder the burden of ensuring that algorithmic governance comports 
with constitutional and statutory requirements vis-à-vis the public.  Litigating 
these issues requires time and money that many litigants do not have. 
Nonetheless, asserting the public interest in transparency is not to diminish 
the importance and the value of individual challenges to opacity.  As Frank 
Michelman has described it in a different context, these two perspectives are 
neither “mutually exclusive [nor] competitive” but rather give a “binocular 
view” of algorithmic transparency.236  As this Article describes below, 
transparency’s legal mechanisms can meaningfully contribute to the project 
of algorithmic transparency along a parallel track without undermining or 
jeopardizing the due process arguments presented in the cases surveyed 
above. 
 
States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (permitting the New York Times 
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 232. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 
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 233. See Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to 
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the criminal justice system). 
 234. Id. at 784; see also D. Brock Hornby, Can Federal Sentencing Remain Transparent?, 
JUDICATURE, Spring 2019, at 46 (describing efforts to conceal sentencing memoranda that 
would reveal a defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement). 
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Debate on Police Discipline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/ 
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1181, 1187 (Ohio 2006) (addressing the conflict between the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act and Ohio’s public records statute). 
 236. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in 
DUE PROCESS:  NOMOS XVIII 126, 131 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977). 
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B.  Transparency’s Statute:  FOIA 
Might FOIA or its state equivalents directly constrain the use of 
proprietary algorithmic governance?  Efforts to leverage the guarantees of 
open records litigation in support of algorithmic transparency confront 
several doctrinal hurdles.  Although FOIA’s requirements are intended to 
open government decision-making to public view, the law does not, itself, 
impose obstacles to the use of private decision-making authority.237  Instead, 
it creates an administrative process for a member of the public to request 
government records and confers federal jurisdiction on district courts, which 
can enjoin agencies from withholding records or order them to produce 
records which have been “improperly withheld.”238 
But the interests protected by FOIA and its state counterparts—enhancing 
“public knowledge of Government operations”239—suggest some limits on 
the government’s use of proprietary, secret decision-making methods.  The 
extensive body of FOIA case law emphasizes the necessity of understanding 
both the mechanisms and outcomes of decision-making.  Moreover, the 
broad principles of open government embodied in FOIA suggest that 
shielding government decisions by using proprietary means is inappropriate. 
Congress enacted FOIA in response to an administrative state that had 
become increasingly secretive.240  The purpose of the statute was to “pierce 
the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of 
public scrutiny.”241  The statutory structure reflects its purpose, allowing 
“any person” to submit a request for agency records and requiring agencies 
to respond—unless the material falls within one of nine enumerated 
exemptions.242  In addition, FOIA requires agencies to affirmatively publish 
several categories of rules, procedures, and statements of policy, either in the 
Federal Register or in electronic “reading rooms.”243  In contrast to the legacy 
 
 237. See Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY 
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 243. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2); see also Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 846 F.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (describing § 552(a)(2) as the “reading-
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of administrative secrecy, FOIA instead embraced a philosophy of 
“maximum access.”244 
An initial obstacle to efforts to promote algorithmic transparency concerns 
FOIA’s limitation that it applies only to those records which an agency 
“controls.”245  To determine whether an agency “controls” a record, courts 
apply a multifactor test that examines the intent of the creator, the agency’s 
ability to “use and dispose of” the record, and its use and integration of the 
document within its own system.246  The “decisive factor” in establishing 
whether a document is a government record is whether an agency has used, 
read, or relied upon it, because only if it has done so would disclosure 
vindicate FOIA’s fundamental values by helping the public learn about 
government decision-making.247 
FOIA’s “control” requirement reflects its goal of shedding light on records 
that actually reflect government decision-making.248  This statutory purpose 
suggests that when agencies adopt and rely upon proprietary materials or 
software in making decisions, those materials should generally be considered 
matters of public record—regardless of the licensing or contractual 
provisions that govern.249  Indeed, allowing contracts between the 
government and its vendors to remove the infrastructure of decision-making 
from public control reflects a formalistic approach that privileges the private 
sector’s economic and political power while virtually eviscerating the 
purposes of the statutory protections.250  As Justice William J. Brennan put 
it in a scathing dissent in 1980, secret governance is equally “destructive of 
democracy” regardless of the formal contractual means by which it is 
accomplished.251 
While courts have rarely had the opportunity to consider FOIA requests 
for proprietary records that are at the core of the government’s decision-
making functions, the emergence of algorithmic governance puts this balance 
to the test.  But courts ought to look askance at efforts to hamper public access 
in ways that would permit the government “to insulate itself from public 
scrutiny of its operations and regulatory decisions.”252  Where governments 
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West, a legal publisher, had entered into a contract with the Department of Justice through 
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adopt proprietary decision-making methodologies that impact their 
“structure, operation, or decision-making procedures,” those records ought 
to become public.253  In other words, although not every item that the 
government procures or licenses from the private sector becomes a “public 
record,” those that are at the core of the government’s decision-making 
functions—the transparency of which is the primary interest protected by 
FOIA—are likely to be covered by the statute’s disclosure regime. 
1.  Exemption 4 
Even assuming that the records are controlled by an agency, however, 
FOIA’s exemptions may also impede efforts to obtain access to proprietary 
decision-making tools.  FOIA’s “Exemption 4” provides that “trade secrets 
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential” are exempt from disclosure.254  For example, 
courts have denied FOIA requests for proprietary videoconferencing 
software, reasoning that even assuming the records were “agency records,” 
they would be protected under Exemption 4.255 
Like the control requirement, FOIA’s broad exemption for trade secrets 
and confidential business information was intended to stimulate information 
sharing with the government, not to shield government decision-making from 
public scrutiny.  The statute’s legislative history confirms that the exemption 
was meant to protect “information which is obtained by the government 
through questionnaires or other inquiries, but which would customarily not 
be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.”256  
Congress anticipated that information such as “business sales statistics, 
inventories, customer lists, and manufacturing processes” submitted to an 
agency would be kept confidential.257 
But Exemption 4’s protections extend beyond trade secrets to protect 
confidential commercial information as well.  In an influential 1974 decision, 
the D.C. Circuit held that, in order to satisfy the requirements of Exemption 
4, courts must not only determine whether information is “confidential” but 
also that “non-disclosure is justified by the legislative purpose which 
underlies the exemption.”258  Under this approach, Exemption 4 recognizes 
that information can be withheld if disclosure is likely “(1) to impair the 
Government’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to 
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cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom 
the information was obtained.”259 
In June 2019, however, the U.S. Supreme Court found the “substantial 
competitive harm” requirement “inconsistent with the terms of the 
statute.”260  Instead, the Court reasoned that, in order to shield commercial 
or proprietary information from disclosure, FOIA required only that the 
owner of that information “customarily and actually” treat it as secret and 
that the government promise to keep the information secret as well.261  The 
result is to expand the scope of plausible Exemption 4 claims.262 
Agencies may be even less likely to comply with FOIA requests when they 
expect that a vendor or contractor would not want to comply.  Agencies 
normally notify government contractors when information that may be 
confidential is sought under FOIA.263  Those who submit confidential 
information to the government can file a “reverse FOIA” suit seeking to 
enjoin an agency from releasing that information.264  As one commentator 
has observed, “even the threat of a reverse-FOIA action creates an 
environment where agencies are more likely to work with contractors” to 
prevent disclosure.265 
Nonetheless, there is some room for optimism that Exemption 4 might not 
shield the methodologies of government decision-making from disclosure.  
First, there is little evidence that Exemption 4 was intended to cover decision-
making methodologies employed by the government in making 
determinations about constitutional rights.  Although the federal courts have 
repeatedly held that even organizations that are delegated fairly extensive 
authority by the executive branch are not subject to FOIA,266 that conclusion 
is questionable where those organizations make determinations about 
constitutional rights.  Although the government does have an interest in 
ensuring the “continued availability” of information and materials that are 
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voluntarily provided to it by the private sector, this does not suggest that the 
private sector should be able to condition its services on confidentiality.267 
2.  Exemption 5 
FOIA’s “Exemption 5” may also pose a hurdle to disclosure of proprietary 
decision-making software.  FOIA exempts from disclosure information that 
is subject to the deliberative process privilege.268   This exemption is intended 
to protect the integrity of the formulation of government decisions and policy 
by shielding them from outside interference and scrutiny.269  Facts are not 
exempt; only those materials that would “expose the deliberative process” 
can be withheld.270  And because the privilege only protects “predecisional” 
material, it cannot be asserted after an agency accepts or relies upon it.271 
No court has upheld a claim that automated decision systems should be 
considered “deliberative.”  Indeed, many automated decision systems are 
likely to contain more unprivileged “facts” than privileged “deliberation.”272  
And acceptance of a decision made by an automated tool would extinguish 
any privilege in any event.273 
In a 2006 case, the attorney general of Massachusetts sought access to EPA 
records related to the use of a “proprietary computerized model . . . to prepare 
forecasts utilized in evaluating the relative costs and benefits of alternative 
proposed regulatory approaches to pollution control.”274  The court rejected 
EPA’s invocation of the deliberative process exemption, reasoning that the 
model was essentially an “investigative technique utilized to generate raw 
data.”275  While the data undoubtedly would reflect, to some extent, the 
agency’s thought process, the court went on, “This is true of any investigation 
by which an agency seeks facts—knowing what questions are asked or which 
witnesses are interviewed reveals aspects of what the investigator deemed 
important or worthy of consideration.”276 
Nonetheless, this reasoning has not stopped government agencies from 
claiming that the deliberative process exemption shields reasoning that was 
aided or developed by automated means.  In one recent case under Illinois’s 
Freedom of Information Act, a newspaper sought access to records related to 
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the Cook County Assessor’s Office’s methodology for valuing property for 
the purposes of assessing property taxes.277  The methodology involved using 
a computerized regression model to compare properties to other similar 
properties, after which analysts examined the results, made adjustments, and 
finalized the values.  The court rejected the office’s invocation of the 
deliberative process exemption, recognizing that the requested records were 
“not ones in which opinions are expressed or in which policies or actions are 
formulated—they are factual.”278 
Although open records laws have gone fairly untested as means to compel 
the disclosure of proprietary decision-making tools used by government, they 
call into question the legitimacy of government contracts that require secrecy 
in decision-making.  It is axiomatic that public records laws ought to be 
“liberally construed” to promote public access to government records.279  
Some state open records laws explicitly prevent the government from 
entering into contracts that would “impair[] the right of the public” to access 
public records.280  Other state courts have simply found that certain secret 
actions taken by government are inconsistent with state open records laws.281  
As such, public records laws provide critical support for opponents of 
algorithmic opacity. 
C.  Transparency’s Constitution:  The First Amendment 
The First Amendment is equally hostile to secret government decision-
making.282  This hostility stems, in part, from a central observation of First 
Amendment theory that an inextricable link binds together democracy, self-
governance, and free expression.283  The understanding that free expression 
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is “indispensable to the operation of a democratic form of government” is at 
the heart of several accounts of the “meaning” of the First Amendment.284  
And while many theorists would extend the meaning of the First Amendment 
much farther, at a minimum, the “political speech” that lies at the core of 
First Amendment interests would appear to include speech regarding 
government decision-making.285  These interests cut against secretive 
government proceedings that cannot be monitored or scrutinized by the press 
or public. 
Reflecting the prevailing view that information about government 
decision-making is critical both to democracy and to public debate, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the public has a constitutional right of 
access to government proceedings and records rooted in the First 
Amendment.286  In 1978, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized “a general 
right to inspect and copy public records and documents” under common 
law.287  In 1979, the Supreme Court—while holding that the Sixth 
Amendment did not guarantee a public right of access to criminal trials—
indicated that there might be a right of access to criminal trials couched in 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.288  In following years, the Court 
broadened its interpretation, finding that the public must be able to attend a 
variety of criminal proceedings—including trials,289 voir dire,290 and 
preliminary hearings.291 
In its 1980 opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,292 the Court 
explicitly linked the right to attend criminal trials to broader First 
Amendment values, reasoning that, “without the freedom to attend such 
trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of 
freedom of speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”293  And in his 
influential concurring opinion, Justice Brennan also emphasized the 
functional importance of the right of access, identifying open government 
proceedings as a critical feature of the First Amendment’s “structural 
role . . . in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.”294 
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The First Amendment right of access to government proceedings requires 
that preliminary criminal hearings be held in open court.295  Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court296 (Press-Enterprise II) set forth a two-pronged test 
for determining whether the public must have access to a given proceeding 
and held that a court considering an access claim must assess both “whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question” and “whether the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public.”297  If the First 
Amendment right attaches, proponents of closure must meet a demanding 
standard.298 
Importantly for the enterprise of algorithmic risk assessment, Press-
Enterprise II and its progeny established a presumption of openness 
regarding bail hearings.  Numerous courts have recognized that the 
functional benefits of public access, which serves as “a check on judicial 
conduct and tends to improve the performance both of the parties and of the 
judiciary,” are as apparent in pretrial release proceedings as in other judicial 
proceedings.299  Perhaps even more so:  “The decision to hold a person 
presumed innocent of any crime without bail is one of major importance to 
the administration of justice,” and the community is “directly affected” by 
these decisions.300 
By the same token, the press and the public have a constitutional right to 
attend sentencing and have access to sentencing-related documents.  This 
right is integrally related to the court’s duties in sentencing, which are 
independent from those of the jury.301  At sentencing, public access is 
particularly important because it “operates to check any temptation that 
might be felt by either the prosecutor or the court to obtain a guilty plea by 
coercion or trick, or to seek or impose an arbitrary or disproportionate 
sentence.”302  Likewise, sentencing is socially significant to numerous 
audiences:  to “friends and family members of the defendant being 
sentenced,” to “victims of crimes, to family members of victims, and to 
members of the community in which the crime occurred.”303  Sentencing is 
also a particularly “solemn occasion at which the judge has the weighty duty 
of determining the fate of another human being.”304  These perspectives have 
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remained part of the logic of holding open sentencing hearings despite the 
increasingly transactional nature of sentencing, which today includes 
“precious little discussion of the human qualities of the victim or the 
defendant, of the inherently unquantifiable moral aspects of the defendant’s 
crime, or of the type of sanction that would best achieve any of the purposes 
of sentencing.”305 
The First Amendment interests in open government proceedings suggest 
that proprietary algorithmic governance mechanisms may violate the 
Constitution.  As one commentator has put it, “once a computerized 
algorithm is used by the government, constitutional rights may attach.”306  
When the government relies upon an automated decision system to generate 
evidence at trial, to set bail, or to determine a sentence, the public’s First 
Amendment rights demand that those proceedings be held in an open and 
transparent manner.  By shielding the methodology of decision-making from 
public view, the government undermines critical assumptions of the First 
Amendment. 
IV.  TRANSPARENCY REMEDIES FOR ALGORITHMIC OPACITY 
Time and again, litigants directly confront black box procedures that result 
from the outsourcing or privatization of government decision-making.  This 
opacity often flouts constitutional or statutory requirements of openness.  In 
short, these challenges can be understood as efforts to obtain access to key 
information needed to understand government decisions that affect people 
directly. 
Reframing algorithmic decision-making as reflecting a public interest in 
disclosure, rather than a purely private interest in due process, brings to the 
fore a central dynamic.  When courts find that the Constitution or a statute 
requires the disclosure of how the government reaches its decisions, we 
should understand that that requirement is not a relic of procedural due 
process alone.  Rather, it reflects fundamental values of open government 
that are codified in the Freedom of Information Act, its state equivalents, and 
the First Amendment.  Those mechanisms—the fabric of the law of access—
are hostile to privatized, proprietary decision-making. 
Viewing algorithmic governance through the lens of access law introduces 
a new perspective into the discussion of accountability and transparency for 
automated decision systems.  Not only should algorithmic governance be 
accountable to those whom it affects, it should also satisfy, or at least not 
violate, fundamental values of open government that are core to our 
democratic system.  These values cast doubt on the viability of the 
frameworks that have developed to limit the flow of critical information 
about algorithmic governance. 
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A.  Secrecy by Contract 
At bottom, the transparency problem raised by algorithmic governance as 
it is presented today results largely from procurement practices that fail to 
foreground the public interest.  As Catherine Crump has documented, this 
problem is particularly pronounced in the context of criminal law 
enforcement and surveillance.307  State and local government agencies 
seeking to secretly procure surveillance technologies can often either face a 
lack of awareness and interest by legislative officials or avoid legislative 
oversight entirely.308 
From the perspective of intellectual property law, the dueling interests 
between vendors’ trade secrecy claims and plaintiffs’ challenges seem 
unremarkable.309  But from the perspective of procurement law, this need not 
be so.  States differ widely with regard to how public contracts should treat 
intellectual property rights.  Some states generally treat these contracts as 
conferring licenses upon state actors, while others, by default, allocate full 
ownership of intellectual property to the state.310  Some have criticized this 
allocation of intellectual property ownership to the state, writing that 
conveying such ownership to a public purchaser simply is not necessary for 
“the efficient and cost-effective delivery of supplies and services.”311  In the 
mine-run of cases, this observation is likely correct. 
But where intellectual property rights are likely to clash with governments’ 
obligations under transparency laws, perhaps different contract terms should 
be anticipated.312  Procurement law anticipates a distinction between items 
that are used for “governmental purposes” and those that are not.313  Surely, 
the allocation of government benefits and decisions regarding critical civil 
rights and liberties are “governmental purposes.”  This suggests that these 
tools are not generally “commercial” systems.314  Indeed, many vendors of 
automated decision systems have government agencies as their primary, or 
sole, customer base. 
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Acting as consumers, governments can therefore require more demanding 
contract terms that bring their procurement processes into alignment with due 
process and transparency requirements.  A draft bill recently introduced by 
the Washington State Legislature exemplifies this approach.315  The draft bill 
requires that automated decision systems have several transparency and 
accountability-enhancing features, including that they be open to audit and 
inspection by state agencies and third parties and that they be capable of 
giving intelligible explanations for the decisions they reach.316  In terms of 
procurement, the Washington bill also requires that procurement contracts 
for automated decision systems cannot contain nondisclosure provisions or 
other obstacles to transparency.317  Washington’s approach provides sound 
guidance for other jurisdictions to follow in reforming their procurement 
policies for algorithmic governance. 
B.  Transparency for Me, but Not for Thee 
In an atmosphere of increasing automation and privatization, these cases 
pit proprietary interests in trade secrecy against individual interests in 
transparency.  Faced with demands for more transparency, courts and 
litigants have sometimes reached an apparent compromise:  protective 
orders, coupled with nondisclosure orders, that permit disclosure to the 
parties while preventing disclosure to the general public.318 
In this vein, numerous commentators have suggested that vendors’ claims 
of trade secrecy cannot simply surmount the rights of affected individuals to 
understand and challenge decisions that affect them.319  The scholarly 
consensus appears uniform:  simply privileging vendors’ assertions of trade 
secrecy over the affected parties’ rights is inappropriate.320  Faced with 
concerns about how to balance proprietary interests against those of 
individuals who seek to challenge algorithmic determinations, however, 
many have suggested that courts could employ protective orders to ensure 
that vendors could be compelled to disclose proprietary information to 
individual litigants while shielding the same information from public 
view.321 
From this perspective, the chief problem with algorithmic opacity is that 
the individuals who are affected should have sufficient information to 
understand how they are assessed, judged, and scored.322  Only by enabling 
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the disclosure of this information can we vindicate individuals’ dignity, 
autonomy, and due process rights.  Within this paradigm, striking a bargain 
with vendors that facilitates these important disclosures is often worth some 
cost to public knowledge.323  And although some scholars have expressed 
some unease with the impact that this solution might have on broader 
interests in transparency, they have not critiqued it on these terms.324 
This assumption that protective orders can appropriately balance the 
interest in disclosure against intrusion into the proprietary interests of the 
developer overlooks, however, the importance of information about 
algorithmic governance to the public as a whole.  Viewing algorithmic 
decision-making through the lens of the law of access makes clear that these 
new tools impact not only those who are directly affected by algorithmic 
decision-making but also the general public.  Extensive reliance on 
proprietary decision-making methods runs headlong into the principles that 
underpin transparency protections embedded in the First Amendment’s right 
of access to government proceedings and open government statutes such as 
FOIA. 
As a procedural “fix” for problems of algorithmic opacity, protective 
orders raise serious problems of their own.  First, this framework makes 
explicit an assumption that the methodologies of proprietary decision-
making in government need only be disclosed to the individual plaintiffs who 
choose to bring challenges.  This assumption overlooks the resonance of calls 
for more transparency and accountability for broader populations who are not 
represented before the courts.325  Yet the implications of these cases for 
unrepresented parties are clear:  each of the algorithmic tools described in the 
foregoing sections makes decisions that affect thousands of individuals.  
Bringing these cases as class actions, as in the health-care context, or on 
behalf of institutional plaintiffs, as in HISD, can partially solve the problem 
of representing the interests of all, or as many as possible, of the affected 
individuals.  But protective orders, by design, impede the flow of information 
to those individuals, as well as to the press and the public.  This issue was 
presented in sharp relief in the Idaho case, in which the plaintiffs rejected the 
state’s offer to enter into a protective order, instead insisting that the 
information they sought be disclosed not only to the named plaintiffs but also 
to every participant in the budget waiver program.326 
In fact, relying on individual plaintiffs to challenge—and gain access to—
proprietary decision-making tools on an ad hoc basis has serious social costs 
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because the parties to these cases will be unlikely to push back on overly 
broad assertions of trade secrecy or other proprietary interests.  As the HISD 
case demonstrates, in civil cases, the incentives to consent to a protective 
order are typically high.  Litigants who are challenging opaque algorithmic 
decisions often settle, plead guilty, or accept disclosure of key information 
regarding the challenged methodology subject to a protective order that 
prevents the public from gaining access.327  This dynamic is all the more 
pronounced when the litigants are poor individuals or underresourced 
organizational parties.328  Although criminal defendants have been on the 
front lines of efforts to compel disclosure of vital information related to black 
box tools, many more have simply pleaded guilty when faced with 
inculpatory evidence from algorithmic tools.329  It is hardly surprising that 
individuals of limited means—such as Kevin Johnson, the defendant in the 
FST case who was represented by the Federal Defenders of the Eastern 
District of New York—would accept these tradeoffs.330 
The result is that, by employing protective orders to make records 
available to the parties but shielded from the public, the courts create a 
framework of “information silos.”331  The silo vividly symbolizes the 
problem of isolated decision-making within impermeable walls, unmoored 
from relevant outside experience or expertise.332 
Protective orders create silos by making disclosure to individuals 
contingent on their silence to a broader audience.  In essence, each individual 
recipient of the information exists in his or her own silo, unable to 
communicate that information to others who might want or need it.  This is 
precisely the issue raised by the disclosure of source code by Dräger, one of 
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the breathalyzer vendors.333  As a matter of policy, Dräger will disclose its 
source code in any criminal proceeding, subject to a protective order.334  The 
protective order makes clear the devil’s bargain:  even though Dräger’s 
source code is material to hundreds, if not thousands, of cases, the broader 
public is permitted to know very little about how it functions.335  Indeed, 
when two defense experts presented a report describing flaws in the code to 
an annual convention of DUI lawyers—many of whom had worked on cases 
involving Dräger source code—the company claimed it had been 
defamed.336  The same issue would be confronted by Legal Aid attorneys 
who represented individuals seeking to challenge their Medicaid waiver 
benefit determinations or lawyers for the Houston teachers’ union who 
represented teachers seeking to challenge their terminations.337 
There might be good reasons, in some cases, to limit disclosure of 
information to individual litigants instead of to the general public.  For 
instance, it is easy to imagine that certain medical information, key to the 
outcome of a hearing on eligibility for Medicaid benefits, is private and not 
subject to disclosure.  In some settings, there might also be legitimate 
concerns that automated systems could be “gamed” if they were too open.338  
But when the information regards the methodology for how government 
decisions are made, it is much harder to understand what interests could 
possibly support secrecy.  The entire framework of the law of access to 
government proceedings and records is intended to ensure that information 
critical to public debate and oversight is available to all, not just to a few.339  
When information is sufficiently important to be disclosed to individuals, 
making that disclosure contingent on a broader silence makes clear that the 
compromise in fact comes at a significant cost to the public interest.340 
New legislation may advance the interests of both defendants and the 
public.  In September 2019, Representative Mark Takano introduced the 
Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019,341 a bill designed to promote 
defense access to evidence in criminal proceedings.342  The bill, which was 
influenced by the work of Rebecca Wexler and Andrea Roth, would amend 
the Federal Rules of Evidence to forbid using the trade secret privilege alone 
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to shield evidence from disclosure to defendants.343  In addition, the bill 
would task the National Institute of Standards and Technology with setting 
standards for forensic software, including standardizing requirements for 
“publicly available documentation” of the software, its training data, and its 
testing methodology.344 
The Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act does not address protective orders, 
but it nevertheless reflects a powerful endorsement of public standard-
setting, documentation, and testing of forensic algorithms.  In doing so, the 
Act partially responds to Ellen Goodman and Robert Brauneis’s call for 
government agencies to require more documentation of algorithmic systems 
to render them transparent.345  But while the due process and Brady issues in 
the context of forensic evidence are pronounced, there is no reason that the 
Act’s approach should be limited to forensic algorithms alone.  Indeed, the 
other applications of algorithmic governance described in Part I reflect the 
same need for standardization, validation, and public documentation of 
algorithmic decision-making systems to render them transparent and 
accountable.  If anything, the use of proprietary algorithmic decision-making 
in contexts that deprive individuals of their civil rights has gone relatively 
underreported and unnoticed by Congress.346  Congress should therefore 
advance a similar approach in considering the use of algorithmic decision-
making systems in civil contexts, including (if necessary) by amending the 
Medicaid Act and by limiting the provision of federal funding in contexts 
where state agencies rely on black box proprietary decision-making systems. 
C.  The Challenge to Transparency Values 
More generally, algorithmic tools sometimes appear to defy the traditional 
logic of government oversight—that “sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants,” that the public’s presence can benefit proceedings, and that 
public oversight can benefit the operations and structure of governance.347  If 
we accept the premise that algorithmic governance is more “efficient, 
valuable, powerful, and objective” than its human counterparts, then why 
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value transparency at all?348  Maybe we can look toward a future in which 
government-by-machine need not bother with the administrative headache 
and “burden” of responding to FOIA requests and producing documents.349  
Indeed, the value of public observation and participation in the democratic 
process looks a lot like the kind of subjective, “clinical” judgment at which 
advocates of actuarial measures look askance.  If actuarial measures are 
already accurate and fair, it’s difficult to understand how “[p]ublic scrutiny 
of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the 
factfinding process” or “fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby 
heightening public respect for the judicial process.”350 
In other words, algorithmic governance resists the straightforward 
application of existing transparency mechanisms, but not only because of 
practical obstacles.  The major threat to government transparency in an 
algorithmic age is not simply that processes have become obscure, 
automated, and outsourced.  Rather, it is easy to see how the promise of 
“objectivity”—even if it is false—can undermine the core assumptions of 
transparency law.  When government decision makers can disclaim 
responsibility because they have simply adopted an ostensibly neutral 
recommendation generated by a technological tool, it diminishes the public’s 
ability to hold the government accountable. 
As such, algorithmic governance also lays bare the need for enhanced—
not minimized—transparency and accountability measures.  The public-
oriented perspective on government oversight evinced in the transparency 
case law helps to inform judgments about when accountability is necessary, 
why transparency is helpful, and how we might want to approach algorithmic 
decision-making in law and in government.351  While current research 
(perhaps rightly) focuses on the individuals and institutions who are directly 
affected by algorithmic governance, the adoption of these methodologies also 
creates a ripple effect, shielding the decision-making process from scrutiny 
by affected parties and by the public.352 
Updating transparency law for the algorithmic age will take work.  To 
begin, courts should critically examine the application of trade secrets 
protections to shield government decision-making processes from scrutiny.  
As articulated in Part II.A, this practice lacks any basis in FOIA’s case law 
and is in substantial tension with the fundamental values of FOIA.  These 
fundamental values also suggest some potential changes in government 
procurement and contracting processes.  Informed by the principles of open 
government, agencies and courts should avoid contracting for proprietary 
decision-making tools with vendors who require broad secrecy provisions. 
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The emergence of algorithmic governance also suggests a more vital role 
for affirmative—rather than reactive—disclosure of key information about 
how the government functions.  FOIA and the First Amendment do not 
require the government to create new records or interpret existing policies—
they only require the production of existing records in response to an 
individual request.353  But affirmative disclosure of key information about 
how algorithmic governance works would vindicate values of open 
government, even though it is not required by existing law.  New York City 
has adopted this approach in its pivotal algorithmic accountability bill, which 
requires a new task force to develop a “process for making information 
publicly available that, for each agency automated decision system, will 
allow the public to meaningfully assess how such system functions and is 
used by the city, including making technical information about such system 
publicly available where appropriate.”354 
This affirmative approach to transparency is preferable to a framework that 
relies on individual claimants to challenge opacity on an ad hoc basis.  
Individual due process challenges are insufficient to guarantee meaningful 
public oversight and accountability for algorithmic tools. 
CONCLUSION 
True algorithmic transparency goes far beyond an explanation of a 
challenged action to the individual who is affected.  Rather, as challenges to 
opacity illustrate, algorithmic governance implicates core values of 
transparency law:  access to government records and to key information 
necessary to understand government decision-making.  Viewing algorithmic 
governance through the lens of access law makes clear that automation and 
privatization pose a serious threat to the existing framework, which 
privileges reactive disclosure of existing government records to individual 
requesters.  Rather, just as algorithmic governance portends a new era in 
government decision-making, it must be accompanied by new forms of 
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